Abstract-Network packet length covert channel modulates secret message bits onto the packet lengths to transmit secret messages. In this paper, a novel network packet length covert channel is proposed. The proposed scheme is based on the empirical distribution function of packet length series of legitimate traffic. Different from the existing schemes, the lengths of packets which are generated by the covert sender follow the distribution of normal traffic more closely in our scheme. To validate the security of the proposed scheme, the state-of-the-art packet length covert channel detection algorithm is adopted. The experimental results show that the packet length covert channel provides a significant performance improvement in detection resistance meanings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Covert channel was first introduced by Lampson [1] in 1973 to denote the covert communication mechanism existing in a single host computing environment, by which one process with a high security level would leak information to the other process with a low security level without permission. The covert channels in the multilevel security (MLS) computing environment for single host had been studied sufficiently till Girling [2] firstly extended it into the scope of network covert channel in local area network in 1987.
With the rapid development of network technology and wide-spread adoption of Internet, there is an increasing concern about network covert channels in Internet. Usually, the network packets are sent and received by the special software or the particular hardware to fulfill the corresponding network functions, such as network management, email, file sharing, web browsing and so on. While in a network covert channel scenario, those network packets are simultaneously utilized as carriers to transmit information covertly. Unlike the traditional definition of covert channel, for most network covert channels, the intention is no longer to leak information from the high-level security node to the low-level security node. The covert channel is hidden behind the normal network traffic which can be used as an alternative covert communication manner by particular users or Trojans because it can evade the checks from the network firewalls and intrusion detection systems. It also can be used as "fingerprint" associated with the IP address or MAC code to help tracking the attackers or identifying the participants of the communication [3] .
It is an important characteristic that the modification caused by hiding data into network traffic can not affect the normal function, which is also the remarkable trait to differentiate the covert channel from the network tunnel. In fact, one kind of network tunneling technology is to camouflage the substantial traffic to the covering traffic for carrying a payload over an incompatible deliverynetwork such as HTTP tunnels [4] , ICMP tunnels [5] and so on. There is the other kind of tunneling technology for providing a secure path through an untrusted network such as IPSec or SSH tunnels [6] . In the past years, there are lots of covert channel schemes having been proposed. These schemes can be mainly divided into two types: covert storage channels and covert timing channels according to the used hiding fashion [7] .
Commonly, network covert storage channel refers to hiding information into some packet fields which will not distort the running of the applications. It is typical to use those unused, undefined and optional fields in TCP/IP protocol header to make a covert channel. For example, Rowland proposed to replace the IP identification field or the initial sequence number (ISN) field of a TCP connection [8] . Rowland's methods were broken soon. For improving the security or stealthiness of those kinds of covert channels, the incremental IPID scheme and the encrypted-data-based ISN were presented [9] . The urgent pointer of TCP header with the status URG setting as zero is also used to construct covert channel [10] . Besides the header of TCP/IP protocol, the ICMP padding data, HTTP/FTP consultation packet can also be exploited for covert channel. In general, the traffic of network storage channel can be differentiated from the legitimate one by observing the variation in the alterable packet fields. The traffic normalization which standardizes the packet header fields to their defaults or the legitimate values is an effective way to eliminate network storage covert channels. So the traditional covert storage channels are not steal and reliable enough. The covert channels based on encrypted-data ISN [11] and incremental IPID [12] get improvements in stealthiness. But there are some elaborately designed methods which can still make the successful detection [13] .
Anahthram and Verdu discussed the timing channels in the server queue from the theoretical viewpoint [14] . To construct the covert timing channel in network means to modulate secret message bits into the timing information of network flows. The original covert timing channel is named as ON/OFF covert channel, which transmits one bit by sending or not sending packets in a fixed time interval. Modifying the time delays of two successive packets is another method of encoding secret message bits. For example, Shah et al. [15] proposed a method called JitterBug which imitated the delays of hitting keys on the computer keyboard to transfer secret information through network. Luo et al. [16] proposed a covert timing channel named TCP-Script which used the number of TCP packets in an encoding or decoding burst to achieve covert communication.
There are two resistance methods against network covert timing channel. The detection-based method is to distinguish the message-modulated traffic from the legitimate one. Cabuk et al. [17] introduced a method based on regularity of the interarrival times. In [18] , they proposed a method to detect covert timing channels based on the proportion of similar inter-packet delays. Berk et al. [19] introduced a mean-max ratio of inter-packet delay to detect the network covert timing channels. Gianvecchio et al. [20] introduced an entropy-based approach to detecting network covert timing channels, which was based on the observation that the covert timing channel would change the entropy values of the timedelays. The other resistance method is to introduce the packet jammers to distort the timing information of all pass-by packets. Giles et al. [21] suggested employing jamming devices which will limit the available capacity of covert timing channel.
Network covert channel based on packet length is another important branch. The lengths of packets can be used as carriers to transfer secret messages. Yao et al. [22] proposed a covert channel based on packet length which encoded and decoded secret messages through a matrix shared by the sender and the receiver. Nair et al. [23] proposed to modify the packet lengths of UDP datagram for embedding secret messages. Those methods focus on launching the covert communication based on packet lengths but not concentrate on how to make the communication more covertly. In [24] , Ji et al. gave an improvement on Yao's scheme and make the covert channel more secure. In this paper, we will review Ji's scheme and the state-of-art detection method [25] against the scheme. Following it, a novel network packet length covert channel scheme is presented to resist the existing detection scheme, which is based on the empirical distribution function of packet length series of legitimate traffic.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The typical network packet length covert channel schemes and counter measures are described in Section II. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is introduced to make the statistical analysis of the packet length series in Section III, which give the reason of using the empirical distribution. And the encoding and decoding procedure of network packet length covert channel are also proposed in Section III. Section IV gives our simulation results and the performance analysis. Finally, conclusions are drawn and future work is presented in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK

A. Current Arts on Packet Length Covert Channel
As mentioned in the previous section, Yao et al. [22] proposed a model of covert channel based on packet length named LAWB. In LAWB, the sender and receiver share a secret matrix I, with each cell representing a unique length. The secret message which will be sent is i,
The sender selects a cell ij len randomly from the i th row of I and constructs a packet whose payload length equals to ij len . Then, the packet is sent to the receiver. It is precisely the secret message received by the receiver. In order to improve the undetectability, the matrix I is often scrambled by the sender and the receiver at the same time. However, as the packet lengths are just chosen from the pre-defined fixed range, the distribution of packet length cannot imitate the normal one well. So the covert channel is vulnerable to the detection based on the network packet length checking.
In [24] , Ji et al. designed a protocol-independent covert channel by mimicking the legitimate traffic. Before the transmission of binary bits of the secret message, the sender and the receiver both recorded a same set of normally communicating packet length as Reference. The secret message is partitioned into several groups to be sent. When a group of the secret message is ready to be sent, the sender chooses a packet length from Reference using the secret key shared between the sender and the receiver. The chosen packet length is changed by adding the decimal number of the binary message bits in the group. Finally, the packet with the modified length is transmitted to the receiver and the corresponding packet length is also appended to Reference. After the packet is received, the receiver subtracts the received packet length from the Reference using the same secret key and calculates the decimal number of secret bits. The shortcoming of the scheme is that the packet length distribution of Reference will gradually deviate from the normal distribution because of the continued appending operation.
As the improvement, Ji et al. [26] proposed another protocol-independent network covert channel based on packet length using the same model. The method also took normal network communicating packet length as Reference and secret messages are also partitioned into several groups with w bits each. Reference is sorted in the increasing order and then divided into 2 w buckets. The packet length which is embedded in w secret bits is randomly chosen from the bucket whose number is the decimal equivalent of the w bits. The receiver decodes the secret bits by checking which bucket the packet length belongs to. Different from the previous one, the scheme can imitate the normal packet length histogram well. However, it cannot resist the detection method based on the second order statistics proposed by Sur in Ref. [25] . In the following subsection, we will give the detailed introduction about the detection principle.
B. Detection of Packet Length Covert Channel
Recently, Sur et al. [25] proposed a detection scheme for network covert channel based on packet length. The feature sets were constructed with the first and second order statistics of packet length distribution. 
where m is the length of the dft  vector.
The distortion metric (  ) is defined as
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where n is the number of bins in  and e is the position of a maximum or minimum.
HP is defined as the number of times which two packets at a distance of l and with an absolute difference of d appear in the packet length series P. the normalized adjacency histogram ()
Here, Len(P) is the number of packets in the detection window. The features mentioned above of the legitimate and covert network traffic are used to train a supervised learning based classifier which is chosen as the Fisher linear discriminant (FLD) in [25] . Sur's experimental results show that the proposed classifier can detect the existing covert channels based on packet length with very high accuracy.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
A. Analysis of Packet Length Time Series
As we all know, Ethernet packets have the frame structure as Fig. 1 . A TCP/UDP packet is encapsulated in an IP packet which is further being encapsulated as an Ethernet packet. So the length of packet header is always constant. For instance, the length of IP header and TCP header is 20 bytes, and the length of UDP header is 8 bytes. The length of payload has a greater range of variation. The packet length distributions of TCP and UDP are commonly different. The reason is that the TCP and UDP have different fragmentation mechanisms and the corresponding different applications. Take the file transfer of FTP as example. After the establishment of TCP connection, the sender sends the file in chunks to the transport layer. The TCP protocol stack will divide these chunks into some segments with the maximum fragment size defined in the protocol stack. In general, the last segment size of the chunk will be less than maximum segment size because there is no other datum to be transferred at all in the TCP connection. UDP is a connectionless, unreliable transport protocol. It does not add anything to the services of IP except for providing process-to-process communication. The UDP applications just send messages and do not care much about reliability. Commonly, the payload length of UDP packet is smaller than that of TCP packets in most of applications.
To verify the analysis about the length of TCP and UDP payload, we carry out a simple experiment with the help of the software Wireshark. Fig. 2 shows the lengths of captured packets. The TCP based application is a service which uploads a file to a server, while the UDP based application is Tencent QQ audio chat.
According to the experiments we can find that compared with TCP-based application, the UDP-based one generates packets with more diversified and random lengths. Meanwhile, it is well known that the packet sequence with diversified and random lengths is more suitable for modulating secret message because the intrinsical randomness will provide much more shield for data embedding. Therefore, we choose the packet lengths of UDP-based application as the covert channel carrier. According our investigation, the popular UDP-based applications in Internet mainly include VoIP, video chat, online games, P2P file sharing, instant message and so on. Taking the packet length sequence as the time series, for enhancing the security of packet length covert channel, we need to construct the statistics model of the time series. From the viewpoint of stochastic process, the time series is always expected as stationary, because it is easy to be modeled. Unfortunately, most of packet length series of UDP-based applications are non-stationary according to the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test [27] which is a general approach to testing for stationarity of stochastic process. Commonly, the significance level of the ADF test is set to 5%, and the corresponding critical value is equal to -1.9444. The ADF test statistic for a series is computed and compared to the critical value. If the test statistic is less than the critical value, the series is viewed as stationary. Otherwise, the series is nonstationary.
In this paper, we test typical three kinds of UDP-based Internet applications including Tencent QQ audio chat stream, online game Counter Strike and Tencent QQ video chat stream. The results in Table 1 suggest that the packet length series of these three UDP-based applications are all non-stationary. So they can't be described by a fixed statistical model. In this paper, we take Tencent QQ audio chat stream as the carrier to design the packet length covert channel.
B. Encoding Procedure
Before the transmission of secret messages, the sender communicates normally with the receiver. The sender and the receiver both record the packet lengths. When the transmission of secret messages begins, the empirical distribution function ()
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of the recorded packet lengths is calculated by the sender and receiver. The empirical distribution function of a series 12 { , , , } n x x x is defined as
where 1{A} is the indicator of event A and n is the number of samples in series 12 { , , , } n x x x . Because the packet length is not continuous, the empirical distribution function F is actually defined on the discrete range 12 { , , , }
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. The empirical distribution function of packet length series (total 100, 000 packets) generated by the chosen UDP-based application is shown in Fig. 3 . In this paper, the empirical distribution function is offered to the encoder and decoder of the packet length covert channel to preserve the statistical characteristics. The sender should convert the binary secret message 
L
. Assume that every k (k=m/n) bits of secret message are embedded in one packet length. Then, we need an invertible mapping  as:
The mapping can encode a cluster message bits s={s i , s i+1 , …, s i+k-1 } as one message length l. We expect the mapping can preserve the distribution of the original length series. The common approach to complete the distribution preserving task is to use the inverse transform of cumulative distribution function (CDF). This kind of method is usually employed in the algorithms of modelbased network covert timing channel [28] . Here, we directly employ the inverse transform of empirical distribution function 1 () F  to encode secret messages. In our covert communication scenario, the sender and receiver both record the overt packet lengths series in the normal communication. Before the transmission of secret message, they compute the empirical distribution function of the recorded packet length series and agree the value of k. Then the range T={t 1 , t 2 , …, t T } is partitioned into 2 k sub-ranges as 
They subject to the condition of constraint of (10). , ,...,
After determining those interval sizes
, the boundaries of the corresponding distribution probabilities for these intervals can be gotten as B. Figure 4 . Get the boundaries when k is 2 Fig. 4 illustrates scenario when k is 2. In this example, the range T should be partitioned into 4 sub-ranges and the boundaries B={0, 0.278, 0.467, 0.742, 1}.
In the following encoding process, the k bits of secret message {s i+1 , s i+2 , …, s i+k-1 } are firstly converted into random variable R in the range (0, 1) by (12 
An example of the mapping process from R to l is shown in Fig. 5 . The resulting series Len is used as the modulated packet length for the secret message S. The sender transmits packets corresponding to the length in series Len. 
Automatically, the message bits can be decodes by the conversion from decimal to binary.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, the effectiveness of the detection method based on the empirical distribution function is tested and evaluated. For making fair comparison with Ji's method, we let 2 k  in the whole experiment the corresponding covert channel capacity is equal to that of Ji's scheme.
A packet length sequence which is modulated to carry 100,000 random secret message bits is generated. The embedding rate of the packet length sequence is 100%. The 100% embedding rate implies that all the packet lengths in the sequence are used for secret message embedding. The four statistics of the packet length sequence are calculated and compared to the normal traffic in Fig. 6 . In other words, it is difficult to distinguish the covert traffic from normal traffic.
In the detection scheme, a training set of the four statistics is used to train the FLD classifier. The detection performance of the trained classifier is represented by the receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC). ROC curve is defined by the true positive rates (TPR) with different false positive rates (FPR). A diagonal line from the left bottom to the top right corners denotes the random guess. The ROC curves for our scheme and Ji's scheme are shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 with the embedding rate from 30% to 100%.
It can be observed from Fig. 8 and 9 that the proposed scheme can provide a significant improvement in detection resistance meanings. This paper investigated the stationary of the typical packet length series of UDP based internet applications by ADF test. The results suggest that the packet length series are non-stationary. Then, the conventional modelbased covert channel cannot be used in the network packet length covert channel. For imitating the statistical property of legitimate channel well, this paper proposed a network packet length covert channel based on the empirical distribution function. We perform several statistical tests to evaluate the performance of our scheme. The results show that the network packet length covert channel based on the EMF outperforms the previous scheme. There are several interesting future directions for this work. One is to improve the embedding efficiency of secret messages by introducing some source encoding methods. Another is to improve the robustness of decoding when some packets are lost in transmitting.
